80.

-I do not regard the situation as having passed beyond our strength. It is by no means certain that the French will not fight on in Africa and at sea, but, whatever they do, Hitler will have to break us in this island or lose the war. Our principal danger is his concentrated air attack by bombing, coupled with parachute and air-borne landings and attempts to run an invading force across the sea. This danger has faced us ever since the beginning of the war, and the French could never have saved us from it, as he could always switch onto us. Undoubtedly, it is aggravated by the conquests Hitler has made upon the European coast close to our shores. Nevertheless, in principle the danger is the same. I do not see why we should not be able to meet it. The Navy has never pretended to prevent a raid of five or ten thousand men, but we do not see how a force of, say, eighty to a hundred thousand could be transported across the sea, and still less maintained, in the teeth of superior sea power. As long as our Air Force is in being it provides a powerful aid to the Fleet in preventing sea-borne landings and will take a very heavy toll of air-borne landings.

Although we have suffered heavy losses by assisting the French and during the Dunkirk evacuation, we have managed to husband our air-fighter strength in spite of poignant appeals from France to throw it improvidently into the great land battle, which it could not have turned decisively. I am happy to tell you that it is now as strong as it has ever been, and that the flow of machines is coming forward far more rapidly than ever before; in fact, pilots have now become the limiting factor at the moment. Our fighter aircraft have been wont to inflict a loss of two or two and a half to one even when fighting under the adverse conditions in France. During the evacuation of Dunkirk, which was a sort of No Man’s Land, we inflicted a loss of three or four to one, and often saw German formations turn away from a quarter of their numbers of our planes. But all air authorities agree that the advantage in defending this country against an oversea air attack will be still greater because, first, we shall know pretty well by our various devices where they are coming, and because our squadrons lie close enough together to enable us to concentrate against the attackers and provide enough to attack both the bombers and the protecting fighters at the same time. All their shot-down machines will be total losses; many of ours and our pilots will fight again. Therefore, I do not think it by any means impossible that we may so maul them that they will find daylight attacks too expensive.

The major danger will be from night attack on our aircraft factories, but this, again, is far less accurate than daylight attack, and we have many plans for minimising its effect. Of course, their numbers are much greater than ours, but not so much greater as to deprive us of a good and reasonable prospect of wearing them out after some weeks or even months of air struggle. Meanwhile, of course, our bomber force will be striking continually at their key points, especially oil refineries and air factories and at their congested and centralised war industry in the Ruhr. We hope our people will stand up to this bombardment as well as the enemy. It will, on both sides, be on an unprecedented scale. All our information goes to show that the Germans have not liked what they have got so far.

It must be remembered that, now that the B.E.F. is home and largely rearmed or rearming, if not upon a Continental scale, at any rate good enough for Home defence, we have far stronger military forces in this island than we have ever had in the late war or in this war. Therefore, we hope that such numbers of the enemy as may be landed from the air or by sea-borne raid will be destroyed and be an example to those who try to follow. No doubt we must expect novel forms of attack and attempts to bring tanks across the sea. We are preparing ourselves to deal with these as far as we can foresee them. No one can predict or guarantee the course of a life-and-death struggle of this character, but we shall certainly enter upon it in good heart.

Churchill의 2차 세계대전 회고록을 읽고 있는데, 인류 역사상 상기할 만한 전쟁 - Great, 을 어두에 달고 - 들 중 하나를 전두에서 지휘한 사람치고는 드러내는 감정이 여실히 적어 매 챕터를 넘길 때마다 놀라고 있다. 이런 사람이기에 보다 큰 것을 보고, 더 큰 것을 위해 움직일 수 있는 것인가, 싶기도.

개개의 인간을 숫자로 대할 수 있는. 

-그나저나 욕하는 사람 많아서 ? 싶었는데 이북 상태 진짜 안 좋네, 그냥 하드카피 스캔본입니다. 추천 안 함.

And all I have is my voice and my conscience, and I have to listen to it.

Your conscience?

Yes!

Yes. They're strange things, consciences. Trouble is, what feels best isn't necessarily what works best. I mean, by all means, stand up, look the devil in the eye, tell him what you feel. Why not? It's very satisfying. See what happens. And risk losing. Not just for yourself. For the others. For everyone. Forever.

Or?

Or... You know or. Stay seated. Button your lip. Win. An act of self-denial.

Do you have any idea how hard it is to hand over your conscience to somebody else? This is everything I thought I would never do. -All right. I'm gonna hand mine over to this, uh, fly-fishing, wine-drinking Scotsman.

사실과 생각을 각각의 옮음으로 받아들이고 그를 전개하는 인간을 다루는.

영국의 사법체계를 들여다볼 수 있는 부분 - My lord와 그 가발이라니 - 도 그렇고, 사실과 주관과 사관과 증명과 인간에 관한 무척이나 좋은 영화였습니다. 

Miss Sloane이 그랬듯 이런 영화는 늘 나를 괴롭게 하는데, 옳은 것과 전문성은 전혀 다르다는 것을 지난 시간의 경험으로 혹독하게 깨달았기 때문. 적어도 내가 생각하는 옳음만을 행하고 싶기에 직접 손을 더럽힐 수 있는 필드로 도망친 나와는 전혀 다른, 옳은 것을 증명해나가는 그 지난한 과정과 기다림, 그리고 도출된 결론에 있어서의 전문성.

어쩌면 전문성이란 모두가 인정하는 과정 상의 옳음이 아닐지.

언젠가 어느 로펌과 일을 할 때 시니어 파트너가 했던 이야기가 생각나기도. "무언가 주장하고 싶은 것이 있다면 최대한 많은 사람들의 동의를 얻으세요. 침묵도 좋지만 그건 좀 먼 이야기지요. 적어도 모든 소수를 아우르는, 최대 다수의 동의를 얻은 그 주장은 누구도 부정할 수 없는 공고한 사실이 됩니다."